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In this paper, we study how stress affects risk taking in three tasks: individual lotteries,
Stag Hunt (coordination) games, and Hawk-Dove (anti-coordination) games. Both control
and stressed subjects take more risks in all three tasks when the value of the safe option
is decreased and in lotteries when the expected gain is increased. Also, subjects take
longer to take decisions when stakes are high, when the safe option is less attractive and
in the conceptually more difficult Hawk-Dove game. Stress (weakly) increases reaction
times in those cases. Finally, our main result is that the behavior of stressed subjects
in lotteries, Stag Hunt and Hawk-Dove are all highly predictive of each other (p-value
< 0.001 for all three pairwise correlations). Such strong relationship is not present
in our control group. Our results illustrate a “contextual blindness” caused by stress.
The mathematical and behavioral tensions of Stag Hunt and Hawk-Dove games are
axiomatically different, and we should expect different behavior across these games, and
also with respect to the individual task. A possible explanation for the highly significant
connection across tasks in the stress condition is that stressed subjects habitually rely
on one mechanism to make a decision in all contexts whereas unstressed subjects utilize
a more cognitively flexible approach.
Keywords: stress, contextual blindness, lotteries, coordination games, risk taking
1. INTRODUCTION
How does stress influence human behavior? While a significant amount of the work in this
direction connects chronic stress with poor health outcomes, stress has also been shown to
influence decision-making. The pioneering theory suggests that any stress above an optimal level
unambiguously decreases performance (Yerkes-Dodson Law, Yerkes andDodson, 1908). In spite of
this Law’s intuitive appeal, subsequent research has unveiled a far more subtle relationship between
stress and choice, even in purely objective tasks1. In particular, the recent literature has shown a
complex relationship between stress and an individual’s preference to take risks (reviews in Mather
and Lighthall, 2012; Starcke and Brand, 2012). Studies using incentivized lotteries find that stressed
males choose more risky lotteries while stressed females choose less risky lotteries (Preston et al.,
2007; Lighthall et al., 2009; Van Den Bos et al., 2009)2. In addition, compared to a one-time increase
in stress, chronic stress experienced over the course of 8 days has been shown to more significantly
1For example, subjects under stress are less accurate at identifying visual cues located on the periphery of their vision, but
these same subjects are actually more accurate than their non-stressed counterparts at identifying cues directly in front of
them (Hockey, 1970).
2A differential effect across gender is not surprising since, in general, stress is theorized to affect men and women differently
(Taylor et al., 2000).
Brocas et al. Stress Induces Contextual Blindness
increase risk-aversion (Kandasamy et al., 2014). Finally, cortisol
has been shown to play a role in the preference of subjects to avoid
ambiguity—a concept closely related to risk (Danese et al., 2017).
There is also a small literature studying the relationship
between individual lotteries and two-player coordination
(“Stag Hunt”) and anti-coordination (“Hawk-Dove”) strategic
situations (or “games”). Results in this area are inconclusive.
While some papers suggest a correlation between risk taking
in individual lotteries and risk taking in Stag Hunt games
(Heinemann et al., 2009; Chierchia and Coricelli, 2015),
others do not find any significant relationship (Neumann and
Vogt, 2009; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2013; Büyükboyacı, 2014). Imaging
studies have found correlations in neural activity between choices
in lotteries and Stag Hunt games but no correlation between
choices in lotteries and Hawk-Dove games or between choices
in the two games (Nagel et al., 2014). The authors conclude that
Stag Hunt games engage brain networks associated to risk while
Hawk-Dove games engage brain networks associated to strategic
thinking.
Our paper lies at the intersection of these two literatures
by studying the effect of stress on risk-taking in lotteries and
multi-player games of strategy—Stag Hunt and Hawk-Dove3.
Our laboratory experiment relies on a novel way to represent
these three tasks in an identical context that differs in theminimal
amount to uniquely distinguish each task (Figure 1). Using this
method, differences in behavior across tasks can best be explained
by cognitive flexibility in response to fundamental differences
across tasks rather than spurious differences in presentations.
Our first result is to show that subjects in both the control and
stress condition behave in line with our theoretical predictions. In
particular, our participants take more risks in all three tasks as the
value of the safe option is decreased. They also take more risks in
the individual lottery choice as the probability of the high payoff
is increased (Result 1). Our second and main result is that stress
impairs cognitive flexibility. More precisely, the choices made
by stressed subjects in lotteries, Stag Hunt and Hawk-Dove are
all highly and positively correlated with each other. In contrast,
control subjects show a (weak) correlation between lotteries and
Stag Hunt and no significant correlation between the other pairs
of tasks. A cluster analysis reveals that about one-half of the
subjects under stress allocate a similar and significant fraction of
their endowment to the safe option in all tasks. These subjects
are responsible for strengthening the behavioral relationship
between tasks (Result 2). Finally, we show that subjects take more
time to respond when stakes are high, when the safe option is less
attractive and in Hawk-Dove (arguably, the conceptually more
difficult game). Stress also tends to increase reaction times in all
tasks (Result 3).
The findings suggest that some subjects under stress are
oblivious to the fundamental differences that distinguish
the three tasks (objective probabilities of lotteries, strategic
complementarity of risk-taking in Stag Hunt, and strategic
3There is also a literature relating stress to behavior in multi-person games.
However, it is only tangentially related to our work as it focuses mainly on the effect
of stress on prosocial or anti-social behavior (see Buchanan and Preston, 2014; Van
Den Bos and Flik, 2015 for summaries).
substitutability of risk-taking in Hawk-Dove). This contextual
blindness fits in with recent findings which demonstrate that
stress promotes habits in humans at the expense of goal-directed
performance (Schwabe and Wolf, 2009). It has been shown that
people under stress have an increased reliance on automatic over
controlled cognitive processes (Schwabe et al., 2012) and are less
likely to adjust their initial strategies (Kassam et al., 2009). One
underlying mechanism that could lead to contextual blindness
is the suppressed activation in the left temporoparietal junction
(TPJ) caused by a stressful environment (Engelmann et al., 2017).
Impairment of the TPJ has been shown to negatively impact
a subject’s ability to understand and predict the behavior of
others (Samson et al., 2004) which is particularly important in
games such as Hawk-Dove. Taken together, the results provide a
framework for stress inducing intuitive, rather than deliberative,
decision-making (Yu, 2016). Interestingly, previous research on
decision-making under risk and stress has made it clear that
“such habitual responses do not map neatly onto risk-aversion
or risk-seeking” (Buchanan and Preston, 2014). Our paper shows
that, rather than a story connecting stress and risk preferences,
there is a more complex relationship between stress and risk
evaluation across contexts.
A main implication of contextual blindness is that subjects
under stress are generally more predictable. Knowing a subject’s
behavior in any one task is highly predictive of his behavior
in the other two tasks. In addition, stress may affect the way
we view the agency of our opponent. In our experiment, the
behavior of stressed subjects was similar whether they were facing
an objective probability or a strategic opponent. When facing an
opponent, they expected the same behavior in games that are
opposite in nature. One implication from this is that stress causes
people to treat others as if they have less sophistication or less
agency, which may have other ramifications in social settings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our
experimental design and predictions, with particular emphasis
on the methodological contributions. Section 3 analyzes the
aggregate data in each task and treatment. Section 4 studies
the effect of stress on decision-making both across and within
tasks, which provides our main result pertaining to contextual
blindness. Section 5 investigates how stress and task complexity
affect reaction times. Section 6 concludes.
2. DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
2.1. Experimental Design
We first describe our experimental design. Further details
regarding implementation, timing, and exclusion criteria are
relegated to Appendix A1.
2.1.1. Stress Inducement and Hormonal Analysis
To induce a stress response in our treatment group, we closely
followed the protocol of the Socially Evaluated Cold Pressor Test
(SECPT, Schwabe et al., 2008). This task requires subjects to place
their hand in ice water while their face is video recorded. All 72
subjects in the stress group successfully passed our requirements
for completing the SECPT. To measure hormonal changes, we
followed the “passive drool” protocol provided by the laboratory
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FIGURE 1 | Screenshot of LO (Method 1), HD (Method 2), and SH (Method 3).
that ran our assay analysis (ZRT Labs). Each subject was required
to submit 3 saliva samples in order to collect data on their
baseline, peak, and end cortisol levels. All samples were viable
and were used to measure the amount of circulating cortisol.
2.1.2. Timeline and Saliva Sample Collection
Since stress responses widely vary across individuals, we followed
most of the literature on stress (Preston et al., 2007; Lighthall
et al., 2009; Van Den Bos et al., 2009) and implemented a
between-subjects design, with Control and Stress subjects (such
method also avoids learning and endowment effects). The
timeline of the experiment was the following. First, we provided
detailed instructions of the tasks and performed a comprehension
quiz. Subjects submitted their “Baseline” saliva sample. Subjects
in the control treatment started the tasks immediately after
the Baseline sample, whereas subjects in the stress treatment
performed the SECPT before starting the tasks. Twenty five
minutes after the Baseline saliva sample, all subjects were
instructed to stop making choices in the task, and we collected
the “Peak” saliva sample. Subjects completed the remaining tasks
along with a brief demographic survey. They were shown all their
choices and outcomes and provided the “End” saliva sample. One
outcome was then randomly chosen by the computer to be used
for payment. The average intra- and inter-assay coefficients of
variation were no greater than 7 and 8%, respectively.
The procedure had a limitation. Indeed, due to the absence
of the SECPT task, the experiment took less time in the control
treatment than in the stress treatment. This is reflected in
Figure 2, where the average time between the Baseline and
End saliva sample is 47.6 and 56.6 min, respectively. Ideally,
the control treatment should have included a “placebo” task to
replace the SECPT (e.g., hand immersion in warm water during
3 min) both to equalize the length and attention demand of the
experiment and to have the saliva samples taken at approximately
the same intervals.
2.1.3. Participants and Sessions
The study was reviewed by the University Park Institutional
Review Board at the University of Southern California (UP-
14-00663). Experiments were conducted at the Los Angeles
Behavioral Economics Laboratory (LABEL) at the University of
Southern California. To participate in the experiment, subjects
could not eat, drink anything other than water, smoke, exercise,
ingest caffeine, or chew gum within 1 h upon arriving at the
laboratory. Subjects were also excluded if they had been asleep
within 2 h prior to arriving at the lab or used any lip products at
any time after 8 a.m. on the day of the experiment.
All sessions started at 3 p.m. and lasted no longer than 5:15
p.m. They had either 6 or 8 subjects with, at most, two more
subjects of one gender in a session. We gathered data on a total
of 144 subjects. One subject (stress group) was excluded due to a
baseline cortisol 15 times the average of the sample, so our data is
comprised of the choices of 143 subjects (71 stress, 66 female).
2.2. Tasks
Each subject made choices in three experimental tasks: individual
lotteries (LO), Stag Hunt games (SH), and Hawk-Dove games
(HD). All three tasks have a Safe option S and a two-state Risky
option, RH and RL, so that RL < S < RH . The inherent nature
of risk in each task differs. LO is an individual choice problem,
where the (objective) probability of earning RH , p ≡ Pr(RH), is
known before the choice is made. SH and HD are two-person,
simultaneous, non-cooperative games, where the probability of
earning RH depends on the choice of another subject in the
room. In SH, the probability of earning RH is increasing in the
level of risk chosen by the other subject (a coordination game
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 December 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 236
Brocas et al. Stress Induces Contextual Blindness
FIGURE 2 | Cortisol levels over time.
where risk-taking is a strategic complement), whereas in SH it is
decreasing in the level of risk chosen by the other subject (an anti-
coordination game where risk-taking is a strategic substitute).
The basic structure of the tasks is summarized in Table 14.
To implement these three tasks, we construct the following
novel design. In each round, subjects are given 100 tokens, that
they must allocate between the Safe and Risky options (neutrally
labeled “Option A” and “Option B” in the experiment). The
computer then randomly selects a ball from an urn with 100
green and orange balls (see below). For any token allocation
x (∈ {0, ..., 100}) to Safe and 100− x to Risky, the payoff obtained












RL if the computer draws an orange ball
In words, each token allocated to Safe yields S100 whereas each
token allocated to Risky yields either RH100 or
RL
100 . As x decreases,
the spread between the payoff if the computer draws a green and
an orange ball increases. If the subject sets x = 100, she obtains
S for sure. If the subjects sets x = 0, she obtains either RH (green
ball) or RL (orange ball).
As described, for each token allocated to Risky, the probability
of earning payoffs RH100 and
RL
100 are simply the proportion of green
balls and orange balls in the computer’s urn, respectively. The
only difference between our three tasks LO, SH, and HD is the
way in which the number of green and orange balls is determined:
• In LO, the number of green and orange balls is fixed and
known (given by p).
• In SH, the number of green and orange balls is equal to the
number of tokens that the participant with whom the subject
is matched allocates to Risky and Safe, respectively.
4As it is well-know, SH is a coordination game with two pure-strategy equilibria
(Safe-Safe and Risky-Risky) and one mixed-strategy equilibrium whereas HD
is an anti-coordination game with two pure-strategy equilibria (Safe-Risky and
Risky-Safe) and one mixed-strategy equilibrium.








Stag Hunt - SH
Risky Safe
Risky RH, RH RL, S
Safe S, RL S, S
Hawk-Dove - HD
Risky Safe
Risky RL, RL RH, S
Safe S, RH S, S
• In HD, the number of green and orange balls is equal to the
number of tokens that the participant with whom the subject
is matched allocates to Safe and Risky, respectively.
In addition, in SH and HD subjects are told that their choice
affects the number of green and orange balls in the urn of the
participant with whom they are matched in the exact same way.
That is, in SH (HD) the more tokens a subject allocates to Risky,
themore (less) likely it is that the other participant earns RH .
Figure 1 provides screenshots of the LO (top), HD (bottom
left) and SH (bottom right) tasks. At the top of the screen, the
subject is told the current task (neutrally labeled as “Method 1,”
“Method 2,” and “Method 3,” respectively). She is also reminded
how the number of green and orange balls in her urn is
determined. At the center of the screen, the subject can observe
the parameters of the current round. In these three tasks, S =
$21, RH = $53 and RL = $13. At the bottom of the screen, there
is a slider that the subject can use to allocate her 100 tokens across
Safe and Risky. As the subject moves the slider to test different
token allocations, the earnings for each ball color are calculated
and presented in real-time on the screen. In all three screenshots,
the subject has set x = 29. After the subject is satisfied with the
allocation of tokens, she has to click the “CONFIRM” button to
submit her choice.
Our experiment has twomethodological contributions that we
would like to emphasize. First, the contextual presentation of the
three tasks is almost identical. Only the information concerning
the determination of green and orange balls is changed.
Capturing the inherently different natures of risk in such a
symmetric way serves an important purpose: different behavior
is likely to be only in response to the meaningful differences
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between these tasks, rather than to superficial differences in
presentation or comprehension. Second, endowing subjects with
100 tokens that can be allocated across Safe and Risky can be
used to measure “interior” behavior. In lotteries, it is analogous
to portfolio diversification. In games, it is analogous to allowing
subjects to play mixed strategies. In both cases, it provides more
information than the standard binary choice method.
2.3. Payoff-Variants, Stakes, and Equilibria
Subjects played a total of 48 rounds, 16 rounds of each task all
with different payoffs. The experiment was broken up into blocks
of 4 consecutive rounds of the same task, and all sessions started
with a LO block, which was arguably simpler. Before each block,
subjects were shown a screen reminding them that a new block
was starting. This screen ensured that subjects would be aware
of which task (LO, SH, or HD) they were playing next. For
the games, subjects were randomly and anonymously rematched
after each round. For the lotteries, they were playing an individual
decision problem (the exact experimental instructions are in
Appendix B). To avoid learning effects, subjects did not see the
behavior of their partner nor the color of the ball drawn by the
computer in each round. At the end of the 48 rounds, subjects
observed all their choices and those of their partners. One round
was randomly drawn by the computer and the outcome in that
round was used for payment. Subjects earned an average of $31,
with a minimum of $1 (twice) and a maximum of $53 (three
subjects). In addition to these earning, all subjects were paid a
$5 show-up fee.
We chose the payoffs in order to provide substantial variation
in monetary stakes and equilibrium predictions. First, define:
1 ≡ RH − RL (1)
as a measure of the monetary stakes. For all tasks, we set 1 ∈
{10, 20, 30, 40}. In the analysis, we will refer to “low stakes” as
1 ∈ {10, 20} and “high stakes” as 1 ∈ {30, 40}. Second, given






where α is the probability of choosing Risky. For each 1, we
choose (RL, S,RH) so that α ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}. This gives 16
combinations of stakes andmixed equilibrium predictions in SH.
Finally, notice that once we fix1, then α is proportional to S the
payoff of the Safe option.
Notice that for a given triplet (RL, S,RH), the mixed-strategy





where 1 − α is the probability of choosing Risky. Therefore,
the same payoff-triplets as in SH provide also 16 combination
of stakes (1 ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40}) and mixed-strategy equilibria
(1 − α ∈ {0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2}) in HD. Last, we use the technique
developed by Jessie and Kendall (2015) to select the payoffs
in a way that the differences between games are only in the
component that the Nash Equilibrium uses to make predictions.
Table 2 provides a sample of eight games used in the experiment
and Appendix A2 provides the entire list.
Finally, to create the LO tasks, we choose the payoffs
(RL, S,RH) of the SH and HD games corresponding to the
extreme mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the games: α = 0.2
and α = 0.8. Using these payoffs, we set the lottery probability of
the high payoff RH to p = 0.2 and p = 0.8. Creating four lotteries
in this way for 1 ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40} yields a total of 16 LO tasks.
Table 3 provides some examples of lotteries.
2.4. Predictions
Ourmodel has three parameters (1,α, p) in the LO tasks and two
parameters (1,α) in the SH andHD tasks.
Predictions in LO are standard. Fixing the other two
parameters, Risky becomes more attractive as p increases (first-
order stochastic increase in the risky option) and α decreases (S
closer to RL). The effect of1 is less clear. For example, increasing
1makes Riskymore desirable when p = 0.8 and α = 0.2 and less
desirable when p = 0.2 and α = 0.8.
TABLE 3 | Examples of payoff-variants in LO tasks.
LO (α = 0.2;
1 = 40; p = 0.8)
Safe: 21 w.p. 1
Risky: 53 w.p. 0.8
13 w.p. 0.2
LO (α = 0.2;
1 = 30; p = 0.2)
Safe: 22 w.p. 1
Risky: 46 w.p. 0.2
16 w.p. 0.8
LO (α = 0.8;
1 = 20; p = 0.8)
Safe: 30 w.p. 1
Risky: 34 w.p. 0.8
14 w.p. 0.2
LO (α = 0.8;
1 = 10; p = 0.2)
Safe: 28 w.p. 1
Risky: 30 w.p. 0.2
20 w.p. 0.8
TABLE 2 | Examples of payoff-variants in SH and HD tasks.
SH (α = 0.2, 1 = 40)
Risky Safe
Risky 53, 53 13, 21
Safe 21, 13 21, 21
SH (α = 0.4, 1 = 30)
Risky Safe
Risky 43, 43 13, 25
Safe 25, 13 25, 25
SH (α = 0.6, 1 = 20)
Risky Safe
Risky 36, 36 16, 28
Safe 28, 16 28, 28
SH (α = 0.8, 1 = 10)
Risky Safe
Risky 30, 30 20, 28
Safe 28, 20 28, 28
HD (1− α = 0.8, 1 = 40)
Risky Safe
Risky 13, 13 53, 21
Safe 21, 53 21, 21
HD (1− α = 0.6, 1 = 30)
Risky Safe
Risky 13, 13 43, 25
Safe 25, 43 25, 25
HD (1− α = 0.4, 1 = 20)
Risky Safe
Risky 16, 16 36, 28
Safe 28, 36 28, 28
HD (1− α = 0.2, 1 = 10)
Risky Safe
Risky 20, 20 30, 28
Safe 28, 30 28, 28
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Predictions in SH andHD aremore subtle. By construction, in
all 32 rounds there are two pure-strategy and one mixed-strategy
equilibria. Subjects may move from one equilibrium to another,
so behavior depends crucially on beliefs about the other player’s
action and comparative statics should be taken with a grain of
salt. However, fixing the belief about the other player’s constant,
it seems intuitive that Risky is more attractive in both SH andHD
as the sure payoff S becomes closer to RL, that is, as α decreases.
Again, the effect of changes in the spread of payoffs 1 is more
nuanced and depends on the position of S.
Finally, there are also interesting differences between SH and
HD. SH is a coordination game, where risk-taking behavior
is a strategic complement. This means that, holding constant
the belief about the opponent, a decrease in α offers the
subject more incentives to take risks. Furthermore, the subject
realizes that the opponent also has more incentives to take risks,
reinforcing the value of playing Risky. By contrast, HD is an
anti-coordination game where risk-taking behavior is a strategic
substitute. As α decreases, the subject has more incentives
to choose Risky but realizes that the opponent has the same
incentives, which decreases the value of risk-taking. Overall,
strategic considerations make comparative statics significantly
easier to evaluate when incentives of players are aligned (SH)
than when they are not (HD).
3. AGGREGATE RESULTS
3.1. Stress
Figure 2 shows the evolution of cortisol levels throughout the
experimental sessions in both treatments. Each dot represents
the average level of salivary cortisol samples (ng/mL) taken at
baseline, peak, and end of the experiment. We report minutes
on the x-axis. Note that the timing of the end sample was
different across sessions and we represent the average number
of minutes in each treatment. The control and stress groups
start with statistically indifferent levels of average cortisol (2.42
vs. 2.75; two-sided Welch t-test, p-value = 0.133). The stress
group experiences a large and statistically significant increase in
average cortisol (2.75 vs. 5.16; p-value < 0.001). In comparison,
the control group experiences a slight and statistically significant
decrease in average cortisol (2.42 vs. 2.03; p-value = 0.022).
Higher cortisol levels are also observed in the stress group in the
end sample (1.81 vs. 3.14; p-value< 0.001).
3.2. Allocation between Options
The average proportion of wealth invested in Safe is 0.63 in LO,
0.53 in SH and 0.65 in HD. Results between lotteries and games
are not directly comparable. By contrast, results between the two
games are comparable since the 16 rounds of SH involve the same
payoff triplets (RL, S,RH) as the 16 rounds of HD. We notice a
significantly lower allocation to Safe in SH than inHD< 0.001).
3.3. Testing the Theory
3.3.1. Behavior in Lotteries
Choices in LO conformed to the theoretical predictions. Holding
1 constant, the proportion allocated to Safe increased as α
increased and as p decreased for all stakes and in both treatments.
TABLE 4 | Allocation to Safe as a function of α and 1 by game (pooled
treatments).
SH Stakes (1)
40 30 20 10
α = 0.2 0.31 0.27 0.19 0.23
α = 0.4 0.49 0.46 0.41 0.41
α = 0.6 0.66 0.61 0.62 0.69
α = 0.8 0.75 0.83 0.80 0.82
HD Stakes (1)
40 30 20 10
α = 0.2 0.49 0.49 0.36 0.41
α = 0.4 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.52
α = 0.6 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.78
α = 0.8 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.89
Overall, subjects were (weakly) risk averse. They invested, on
average, 97% of the endowment in Safe when the expected value
of Risky was below the Safe option, against 70% when it was
equal and 17% when it was above the Safe option5. Finally,
the proportion in Safe was significantly lower in the low stakes
rounds (1 ∈ {10, 20}) compared to the high stakes rounds (1 ∈
{30, 40}) under stress (p-value = 0.035) but only marginally in
the control group (p-value= 0.051).
3.3.2. Behavior in Games
The proportion of wealth allocated to Safe varied with α as
predicted in Section 2.4. In SH and keeping beliefs constant,
increasing α makes Safe more attractive for a subject and, as the
same logic applies for the partner, higher allocation rates in Safe
are expected. Table 4 (left) shows that this is exactly how subjects
behave for all stake levels. The average fraction allocated to Safe
was significantly different between all pairs of α for all 1 (p-
values < 0.05). In HD and keeping beliefs constant, increasing
α (that is, decreasing 1 − α) makes again Safe more attractive
and should push more subjects to invest in Safe. However, they
should expect their partner to also invest more in Safe, which
should ultimately reduce the incentives to invest in that option.
This implies that the response to an increase in α inHD should be
less pronounced than in SH. Empirically, Table 4 (right) shows
that increasing α made subjects invest significantly more in Safe
for all pairs of α and all 1 (p-values < 0.05)6. Finally, we also
computed for each individual the average increase in the fraction
allocated to Safe between α = 0.2 and α = 0.8 in both SH
and HD. We found a statistically higher increase in SH than
in HD (0.56 vs. 0.43, p-value < 0.001), suggesting that subjects
understood the difference between the strategic complementarity
and the strategic substitutability of risk-taking in these two tasks.
Last and as noted before, there is no particular reason to observe
an aggregate effect of stakes in behavior. Empirically, we found
none.
Result 1. On aggregate, subjects behave in accordance with our
predictions: the allocation to the safe option is increasing in α in
5Since virtually no subject exhibited risk-loving preferences, the four LO rounds
where Risky has lower expected value than the Safe option contain no extra
information. As a robustness check, we conducted the entire analysis of the paper
without these four rounds. All the results were statistically identical.
6Recall that in SH,α is the probability of playing Risky in the mixed strategy
equilibrium. InHD, 1− α is the probability of playing Risky in the mixed strategy
equilibrium.
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all three tasks and decreasing in p in lotteries. Changes in stakes
have no systematic effect on behavior.
4. STRESS
4.1. Stress and Tasks
We noted a slight increase in the average proportion allocated to
Safe in the stress treatment in all tasks compared to the control
treatment (0.64 vs. 0.63 in LO, 0.55 vs. 0.52 in SH, and 0.65
vs. 0.65 in HD). However, the differences were not statistically
significant. As presented in Figure 3, the cumulative distribution
functions of the average amounts allocated to Safe were also
similar across treatments in all three tasks, with no statistically
significant effect according the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test (p-
value = 0.31 in LO, p-value = 0.31 in SH, and p-value = 0.97 in
HD). Overall, we found no evidence that stress affected behavior
within each task.
The existing literature is ambiguous on this issue. Some
studies have found that stress affects behavior in lotteries (Preston
et al., 2007; Lighthall et al., 2009; Van Den Bos et al., 2009)
whereas others found no effect of stress (von Dawans et al.,
2012; Gathmann et al., 2014). Differences in responses to stress
may be attributed to differences across studies in risk elicitation
methods (BART, IGT, objective lotteries) and experimental
procedures (presence/absence of incentives, hypothetical/real
choices, different stressors). For instance, it may be that the
emotional component contained in the BART experiment
(anticipation of the balloon explosion and visual representation
of such explosion) is responsible for shifts in behavior. Moreover,
in BART and IGT subjects are typically not informed of the
objective probabilities of the events. This ambiguity component
may also trigger different thought processes that are differentially
affected by stress (Buckert et al., 2014; Danese et al., 2017).
4.2. Stress and Gender
In Table 5 we present the differences in allocation across gender.
In the control condition, females allocate significantly more to
Safe than males in LO and SH but not in HD. In the stress
condition we find no significant gender differences in any task.
Our data contribute to gender research in three ways. First, the
fact that women take less risk in LO in the control group aligns
with earlier literature (Charness and Gneezy, 2012). Second,
finding males in the control group to be more cooperative in
SH contributes to our understanding of gender differences in
coordination games. However, we are hesitant to extrapolate
about general inclinations to cooperate since, as suggested by
Croson and Gneezy (2009), gender differences seem to be highly
sensitive to context. Finally, since the only significant gender
differences are found in the control group, we conclude that stress
has the capability to diminish differences between genders.
4.3. The Effect of Stress on the
Relationship between Tasks
Our next question is whether the willingness of individuals to
choose Risky is correlated across tasks. On the one hand, it seems
natural that subjects who are less risk-averse, that is, those who
invest more in Risky in LO (individual lotteries with objective
probabilities) are also expected to take more risks in games.
On the other hand, this may not be necessarily true since our
games have multiple equilibria, so risk-taking in SH and HD
depends crucially on beliefs about the other player’s behavior.
Furthermore, the two games are fundamentally opposite in
the optimal reaction to the other player’s choice (coordination
vs. anti-coordination). Table 6 presents the Pearson correlation
coefficient (ρ) of the proportion allocated to Safe by individuals
TABLE 5 | Average allocation to Safe by gender, treatment and task.
Control Stress
Female Male Difference Female Male Difference
[p-value] [p-value]
LO 0.65 0.60 0.045 0.66 0.62 0.194
(0.018) (0.014) (0.023) (0.020)
SH 0.59 0.46 0.015 0.60 0.51 0.143
(0.039) (0.037) (0.042) (0.040)
HD 0.66 0.63 0.554 0.68 0.63 0.112
(0.033) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027)
Standard errors in parenthesis.
FIGURE 3 | Distribution of average amounts in Safe by task and treatment.
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TABLE 6 | Correlation of individual risk taking behavior across tasks by treatment.
Control Stress
LO SH LO SH
SH 0.347∗∗ – 0.416∗∗∗ –
HD 0.147 0.117 0.461∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; and ***p < 0.001.
across tasks, both in the control (left panel) and stress (right
panel) conditions.
In the control condition, the amount allocated to Safe in
LO is significantly correlated with the amount allocated to
Safe in SH, suggesting that risk attitude is a reasonably good
predictor of behavior in the coordination game. This finding
aligns with previous studies showing a correlation between LO
and SH choices (Heinemann et al., 2009; Chierchia and Coricelli,
2015). By contrast, the control condition shows no significant
correlation between LO and HD or between SH and HD. This
may not be surprising given the previous research showing that
these tasks activate different areas of the brain (Ekins et al., 2013;
Nagel et al., 2014).
By contrast, in the stress condition, the amounts allocated
to Safe are significantly correlated across all tasks. Correlations
are also stronger, suggesting that risk-taking under stress is very
similar across tasks, irrespective of the situation. This important
result indicates that, even though stress did not have an effect
on the overall distribution of risk taking in the population
across tasks, it did affect intra-personal decisions. The result was
confirmed by a set of robust regressions reported in Table 7,
which suggests a stronger relationship between the amount
allocated to Safe in LO, SH and HD under stress than in the
control treatment. This effect will be corroborated with the trial-
by-trial regression analysis.
We then compared the correlation coefficients across
conditions by assessing statistical significance of the Fisher’s r
to z transformations. We found that the correlation between
LO and SH are not significantly different between control and
stress conditions. By contrast, correlations between LO and HD
and between SH and HD respectively are significantly different
(with respective p-values of 0.040 and 0.012). This result further
supports the finding that subjects under stress make choices
that are more similar across tasks than subjects in the control
treatment.
A possible explanation for this result is that subjects under
stress (and only those subjects) exhibit contextual blindness, that
is, they ignore the context that distinguishes these three tasks.
Indeed, LO measures an individual’s propensity to take risks
which has no social context. SH captures a tension between
risk and cooperation whereas HD captures a tension between
risk and aggression. The experiment was designed so that these
contexts were the only difference between tasks. Table 6 reveals
that the behavior of stressed subject when faced with an objective
probability over earnings was strongly and positively correlated
with their behavior when faced with a strategic opponent, even
if games were opposite in nature. For control subjects there
TABLE 7 | Robust regression of the average investment in Safe in SH and HD on
the average investment in the safe option in lotteries (Safe-LO) by treatment.
Control Stress
SH HD SH HD
Safe-LO 0.94∗∗ 0.52∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗
Constant −4.41 32.86∗ −9.33 16.84∗
Robust SE 17.7 11.92 16.94 10.13
Adj. R2 0.168 0.126 0.323 0.460
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; and ***p < 0.001.
TABLE 8 | OLS of investment in Safe in SH and HD including fixed effects.
Control Stress
SH HD SH HD
Lottery 0.70∗ 0.23 0.78∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.20) (0.22) (0.13)
Male −10.07 −1.27 −5.52 −3.64
(5.29) (3.97) (5.46) (3.35)
High Stakes 0.28 0.05 4.87∗∗ 3.42∗
(1.68) (1.54) (1.60) (1.46)
α = 0.8 55.3∗∗∗ 39.3∗∗∗ 54.9∗∗∗ 44.6∗∗∗
(2.37) (2.18) (2.27) (2.07)
α = 0.6 40.4∗∗∗ 30.6∗∗∗ 38.9∗∗∗ 29.6∗∗∗
(2.37) (2.18) (2.27) (2.07)
α = 0.4 17.5∗∗∗ 13.1∗∗∗ 20.9∗∗∗ 11.3∗∗∗
(2.37) (2.18) (2.27) (2.07)
Constant −15.4 30.23∗ −23.2 8.9
(18.0) (13.5) (15.1) (9.3)
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,136 1,136
FE groups 72 72 71 71
df 9 9 9 9
Log-likelihood −5,559 −5,447 −5,429 −5,300
BIC 11,182 10,957 10,922 10,663
Standard errors in parenthesis. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; and ***p < 0.001.
was only a relationship between LO and SH. In other words,
control subjects responded more to the differing contexts than
stressed subjects. One implication is that the choices of subjects
under stress are generally more predictable: knowing the average
amount a subject invests into Safe in any one task provides
significant information about behavior in the other two.
We also ran OLS regressions of the trial-by-trial amounts
allocated to Safe for each game and in each condition. We used
as regressors the individual average amount allocated to Safe in
LO (which captures the risk attitude of each individual), and
dummies for stakes (1 = High stakes), for the position of S
relative to RL and RH (α), and for gender (1 = Male). We
constructed a fixed effect model by including a dummy variable
for each individual. The results are compiled in Table 8.
In the Control condition, the average allocation to Safe in SH
is predicted by the behavior in LO, but the average allocation in
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HD is not. In the Stress condition, the average amounts allocated
to Safe in both SH and HD are highly predicted by behavior in
LO. These regressions further confirm the contextual blindness
result7. We also notice that gender has no explanatory power and
that the allocation to the safe choice is increased for high stakes,
but only in the Stress condition.
To better assess the significance of the effect of stress in HD,
we ran a regression of the trial-by-trial amounts allocated to Safe
inHD in both conditions on the same regressors as before as well
as the individual difference in cortisol between baseline and peak
(1Cortisol) and an interaction term between that measure and
the average allocation to Safe in LO8. For comparison, we ran
the same regression for SH as well. This exercise tests directly
whether the coefficients of the average allocation to Safe in LO
in the previous table are significantly different across treatments.
The results are reported in the first two columns of Table 9. The
absence of a significant interaction in the case of SH confirms that
the amount allocated to Safe in LO does not predict differentially
behavior in SH across conditions. By contrast, the interaction
term is significant in the case of HD, the contribution of the
amount allocated to Safe in LO to behavior in HD differs across
conditions. We finally ran a full regression over both games
using a dummy variable for our games (1 = SH). The results
are reported in the last column of Table 9. The fact that the
three way interaction between the average allocation to Safe
in LO, the treatment and the increase in cortisol is significant
indicates that the interaction between Safe in LO and Stress is
significantly different across games. The regression also shows a
subtle interaction between cortisol increase and games: subjects
who exhibit a higher increase in cortisol level tend to increase
more their investment to Safe inHD.
4.4. Cluster Analysis
The fact that stress does not have any visible effect on aggregate
behavior (Section 4.1) but reduces gender differences (Section
4.2) and impacts the relationship between tasks (Section 4.3)
is puzzling. We therefore decided to study in more detail the
behavior of individuals across the three tasks.
We conducted a cluster analysis in each condition to group
subjects according to their average allocation to Safe in each
task. We retained a model-based clustering method to identify
the clusters present in our population. A wide array of heuristic
clustering methods are commonly used but they typically require
the number of clusters and the clustering criterion to be set ex-
ante rather than endogenously optimized. Mixture models, on
7We also ran the same OLS regressions with the behavior in the other game as
an extra regressor. Results and significance were very similar. Furthermore, and
confirming the results in Table 6, the new variable had a positive and significant
coefficient in the Stress regressions and a positive but not significant coefficient in
the Control regressions. Notice that a two-censored non-linear Tobit model would
allow for censoring at 0 and 100 but requires analysis at the subject-average level
since it cannot account for subject-level fixed effects. The average data was rarely
censored at either 0 or 100 which makes such a model inappropriate.
8The previous analysis only makes a qualitative comparison of the association
between the allocation to Safe in HD and SH and the average allocation to Safe
in LO in the two conditions. A formal analysis of the interactions between money
allocation, games and conditions within the samemodel allows to directly compare
the strength of the across conditions and games (see Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011).
TABLE 9 | OLS with interactions of investment in Safe in SH and HD including
fixed effects.
SH HD All games
Lottery 0.73∗∗∗ 0.28∗ 0.25
(0.19) (0.12) (0.13)
1Cortisol −0.17 −7.81∗∗ −8.33∗
(4.81) (3.22) (3.33)
Game (SH = 1) – – −44.16∗∗∗
(5.36)
Lottery*1Cortisol 0.01 0.12∗∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Lottery*Game – – 0.51∗∗∗
(0.08)
1Cortisol*Game – – 8.67∗∗∗
(2.19)
Lottery*1Cortisol*Game – – −0.13∗∗∗
(0.03)
Male −7.93∗ −3.64 −5.79∗
(3.85) (2.58) (2.52)
High Stakes 2.56∗ 1.72 2.14∗
(1.16) (1.06) (0.86)
α = 0.8 55.11∗∗∗ 41.90∗∗∗ 48.50∗∗∗
(1.64) (1.50) (1.21)
α = 0.6 39.66∗∗∗ 30.12∗∗∗ 34.89∗∗∗
(1.64) (1.50) (1.21)
α = 0.4 19.19∗∗∗ 12.17∗∗∗ 15.68∗∗∗
(1.64) (1.50) (1.21)
Constant −19.44 26.94∗∗ 25.83∗∗
(12.68) (9.3) (8.73)
Observations 2,288 2,288 4,576
FE groups 143 143 143
df 11 11 15
Log-likelihood −11,007 −10,764 −22,037
BIC 22,099 21,613 44,200
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; and ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
the other hand, treat each cluster as a component probability
distribution. Thus, the choice between numbers of clusters and
models can be made using Bayesian statistical methods (Fraley
and Raftery, 2002). We implemented our model-based clustering
analysis with the Mclust package in R (Fraley and Raftery, 2006).
We considered ten different models with a maximum of nine
clusters each, and retained the cluster combination that yielded
the minimum Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). In the
Control condition, the best model consisted of three clusters (C1,
C2, and C3). In the Stress condition, four different clusters best
summarized behavior (S1, S2, S3, and S4). Table 10 summarizes
the descriptive statistics in each cluster. Figure 4 provides a visual
representation of the clusters across treatments9.
In the Control condition, the majority of the subjects (C1)
exhibited the typical behavior: they invested similar proportions
9To better represent the information, we do not use three-dimensional graphs.
Instead, we provide projections of each pair of tasks separately.
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in the Safe asset in LO and HD and less in SH, suggesting large
homogeneity across subjects in this treatment. A few individuals
(C2) were an extreme version of this typical play, with overly risky
behavior in SH. Finally, a minority of all female subjects (C3)
allocated significantly more to Safe in LO andHD, but especially
in SH. This group was responsible for the gender effect detected
in LO and SH in the control condition.
In the Stress condition, there were three main clusters (S4
consists of 3 outliers), similar to the clusters obtained in the
TABLE 10 | Endogenous clusters in each condition (standard errors in
parenthesis).
Control Stress
C1 C2 C3 S1 S2 S3 S4
Male/Female 29/21 9/4 0/9 12/5 10/6 15/20 2/1
% Safe in LO 60.9 58.7 77.7 65.1 52.6 69.1 66.3
(1.11) (2.87) (1.62) (1.30) (2.25) (1.74) (21.7)
% Safe in SH 56.0 12.1 86.0 50.9 27.9 73.4 10.3
(1.49) (2.88) (2.42) (3.13) (5.02) (1.71) (10.3)
% Safe in HD 64.2 60.5 72.5 61.4 54.5 74.7 32.0
(1.87) (6.23) (6.86) (2.46) (2.89) (1.64) (16.2)
control condition. Cluster S1 was the analog of C1, while S2
was similar to C2, except for a safer proportion of choices in
SH. However, half of the subjects were now grouped in S3, a
cluster similar to C3. These subjects allocated a large fraction of
their endowment to Safe in all tasks. S3 had also the particularity
that allocations were extremely similar across tasks (69.1–74.7%
with low standard errors). These subjects were responsible for
strengthening the relationship between tasks. Moreover, there
was no gender supremacy in that cluster, causing the gender effect
observed in the control condition to disappear under stress.
Result 2. Aggregate behavior is similar across treatments whereas
individual choices are affected by stress. A significant fraction
of participants in the stress condition are subject to contextual
blindness, choosing a similar allocation independently of the task.
5. REACTION TIMES
5.1. Task Difficulty
In Table 11 we report the average reaction time (RT) in seconds
separated by task and treatment.
Making choices took more time under stress across all tasks,
although the effect was mostly due toHD. We also found that RT
were longer inHD compared to SH irrespective of the treatment
FIGURE 4 | Representation of choices by cluster in the Control (Top) and Stress (Bottom) conditions.
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TABLE 11 | Reaction time by task and treatment.
LO SH HD All
Control 25.6 24.2 28.2 26.0
(0.71) (0.61) (0.62) (0.37)
Stress 27.3 25.7 31.1 28.0
(0.71) (0.65) (0.73) (0.40)
Difference 0.087 0.097 0.002 <0.001
[p-value]
Standard errors in parenthesis.




EV < S 19.8 19.6 0.937
(1.51) (1.59)
EV = S 28.6 30.3 0.420
(1.59) (1.51)
EV > S 25.6 28.7 0.173
(1.51) (1.70)
(p < 0.001), consistent with the idea that the anti-coordination
game is more complex to evaluate than the coordination game.
5.2. Attention in Lotteries
As reflected in Table 12, risky options with expected value below
the safe alternative (EV < S) were quickly discarded. Subjects
took significantly more time to choose when the expected value
of the risky option was equal (EV = S) or greater (EV > S) than
the safe option (t-test, p-value < 0.01 for all paired comparisons
in Control and Stress treatments). For the more complex lotteries
(EV > S), subjects took slightly more time under stress, although
not significantly so.
5.3. Attention in Games
Table 13 presents the reaction times in SH andHD as a function
of the parameters of the games, α and1.
In SH, we found that RT were shorter for higher α: shortest
at α = 0.8 and longest at α = 0.4 in both conditions (t-tests
of difference, p < 0.01 in both conditions). We also found that
RT were longer in high stakes than in low stakes rounds (t-test
of difference, p < 0.001 in Control and p = 0.012 in Stress).
The trend was identical in HD, with shortest RT at α = 0.8
and longest at α = 0.4 in the control group and α = 0.2 in the
stress group (t-tests of difference, p < 0.001 in both conditions).
RT were also longest in high stakes trials (t-test of difference,
p < 0.001 in both groups). It is unclear why α significantly affects
reaction times in the games. In both SH and HD, increasing α
makes the safe option relatively more valuable. It is plausible that
Safe becomes easier to evaluate as it becomes more attractive,
resulting in a quicker response. As for stakes, we conjecture that
subjects find the decision to be more important (hence, more
TABLE 13 | Reaction time in games as a function of α and 1.
α 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 High Low
SH
Control 24.1 28.2 22.7 21.6 27.7 20.6
(1.74) (1.76) (1.53) (1.49) (1.64) (1.21)
Stress 26.6 30.5 23.8 21.6 28.5 22.9
(1.72) (1.93) (1.62) (1.68) (1.64) (1.47)
HD
Control 29.7 33.5 28.4 21.8 31.4 25.0
(1.54) (1.86) (1.75) (1.31) (1.54) (1.23)
Stress 35.1 34.8 31.6 24.2 35.0 27.2
(1.94) (1.93) (2.24) (1.74) (1.82) (1.36)






High Stakes 6.38∗∗∗ 7.02∗∗∗
(0.74) (0.80)
α = 0.8 −3.69∗∗∗ −9.08∗∗∗
(1.04) (1.13)
α = 0.6 −2.02 −2.49∗
(1.05) (1.14)









Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; and ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
worthy of attention) when, other things being equal, the set of
payoffs is more spread out. In any case, the consistency of the
reaction time comparative statics across games and conditions
is remarkable and deserves further investigation. Finally, in SH
there was no effect of stress. In HD, there was an increase in
RT under stress only when α = 0.2 (p = 0.030) and when
stakes were high (p = 0.015), suggesting an interaction between
game complexity and difficulty to evaluate alternatives. It is
also consistent with studies showing that stress affects working
memory and executive decision-making. High levels of cortisol
have been associated withmore errors in card sorting tasksmeant
to measure executive functioning (McCormick et al., 2007) as
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well as O-span and backwards digit-span tasks meant to measure
working memory (Schoofs et al., 2009).While our finding reflects
the intuition behind results showing stressed subjects performing
worse on more complicated tasks (Schoofs et al., 2009), our
contribution shows that more complicated decisions also take
longer (in our setting, there are no right or wrong decisions).
This finding illustrates an important difference between how
stressed subjects reach decisions in strategic games vs. in working
memory or executive functioning tasks.
We then conducted a mixed effect OLS regression to better
analyze the contribution of each effect to reaction times in both
games. For both SH and HD, we regressed reaction times on a
Treatment dummy (1 = Stress), a Gender dummy (1 =Male), a
Stakes dummy (1 = High stakes), and dummies identifying the
level of α in each round. The results are reported in Table 14.
They confirm the effect of high stakes and α levels reported above.
Stress and gender did not have significant effects.
Result 3. Reaction times are higher in the conceptually more
difficult gameHD, in the more complex rounds of LO, when stakes
are high and when the safe option is intrinsically less attractive in
SH andHD. Stress (weakly) increases reaction times in those cases.
6. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we examined the effect of stress on decision-making
in three tasks: lotteries, Stag Hunt games, andHawk-Dove games.
Previous experiments and neuro-imaging studies suggest that
people are responsive to differences in incentives across these
tasks, which aligns with our control group. However, a significant
portion of subjects under stress do not respond to these different
incentives, which we interpret as contextual blindness.
The results contribute to our understanding of the complex
relationship between stress and decision-making. In this regard,
we found both conflicting and confirming evidence. Unlike some
of the recent literature on lottery choice, in our study we did not
find that stress had a systematic effect on any of the three tasks.
However, our main finding of contextual blindness fits in well
with previous work on stress inducing habituation with regard
to cognitive inflexibility.
Stress-induced contextual blindness is demonstrated by a
predictable pattern where subjects who choose to be relatively
risk-seeking in one context also choose to be relatively risk-
seeking in other, radically different ones. This predictability
can be leveraged in order to reach desirable outcomes in
coordination games either through directly modulating stress
or by optimizing the pairing of players and games. For
example, placing under stress two subjects who are risk-takers
in lotteries may encourage them to be risk-seeking in Stag
Hunt, therefore promoting the payoff-dominant equilibrium
outcome. Alternatively, in settings where subjects need to be
paired together to play coordination games, risk-preference
can serve as a guide to create optimal subject-pairings in
stressful circumstances. In Stag Hunt situations, optimal pairings
would combine subjects with similar risk-seeking behavior in
lotteries whereas in Hawk-Dove situations, optimal pairings
would combine subjects with opposite risk preferences. Practical
applications include team formation in military operations with
limited communication.
Finally, it is surprising to observe similar attitudes when
facing another individual and a lottery draw. The extent to
which contextual blindness contributes to an attributed loss of
opponents’ agency is unclear. Subjects under stress have been
shown to treat other players as less strategic decision-makers
(Leder et al., 2013), but this is different from treating them
as probabilistic outcomes. Further research may disentangle
how stress modulates the level of autonomy attributed to
other players. It may be that stress makes humans less likely
to incorporate the intention of an action, which would have
important implications in social contexts.
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